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Plain Language Interpretation Gone Awry: The New Paradigm of
Pesticides, Water Pollution, and the Inefficient, Ineffective
Overlap of Statutory Schemes
National Cotton Council ofAmerica v. EPA'
I. INTRODUCTION
Water, a relatively straightforward molecule that consists of one
part oxygen and two parts hydrogen, has an unquantifiable value that
belies the simplicity of its chemical structure. However, despite the fact
that water is essential to the survival of all known forms of life,
humankind often mistreats and takes for granted perceived abundant
sources of this valuable substance. Yet, "[w]hen the well's dry," as
Benjamin Franklin aptly stated, "we know the worth of water." 2
In the late 1960's, our "well" - the Nation's navigable waterways -
while not dry, was severely polluted. In 1969, an oil spill off the coast of
Santa Barbara, California and the heavily polluted Cuyahoga River
catching fire as it flowed through Cleveland, Ohio, thrust the state of the
Nation's waterways into the national spotlight.3 In 1970 and 1971, due to
increasing public environmental awareness, the Subcommittee on Air and
Water Pollution, under the Senate Committee on Public Works, began
public hearings to address the need to overhaul the existing Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948.4 These efforts culminated into the Federal
Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 - more commonly known
today as the Clean Water Act (hereinafter " the CWA").s
This note investigates the scope of the CWA and whether it
extends National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (hereinafter
"NPDES") permitting requirements to pesticides, which are separately
regulated under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
' 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009).
2 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK 14 (Skyhorse Publ'g 2007).
JOEL M. GRoss & LYNN DODGE, CLEAN WATER ACT 6 (2005).
4 Id. at 6-7.
5 See Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006)).
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(hereinafter "FIFRA"). In the face of mounting confusion concerning the
possibility of statutory overlap, 6 the Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter "EPA"), which administers both statutes, issued a rule
concluding that pesticides applied in accordance with FIFRA are exempt
from the CWA's permitting requirements (hereinafter "Final Rule").7 Yet
upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held
that EPA's Final Rule ignored the plain language of the CWA, and
consequently vacated the rule.8
The significance of this decision demands critical review. While
under a plain-meaning analysis of the relevant provisions, the court was
likely correct, its decision conspicuously lacked any statutory contextual
analysis that may have been warranted and could have led to an alternative
outcome. Furthermore, while a victory for environmentalists, this decision
will certainly have negative ramifications for human health and, ironically,
the environment.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
th
On November 27 , 2006, under EPA's authority to promulgate
regulations consistent with the mandates of the CWA, EPA implemented
its Final Rule.9 Timely petitions for review were filed by two groups of
petitioners, "Industry Petitioners" and "Environmental Petitioners."] 0 A
third group, "Industry Intervenors," filed a motion to intervene in the
action in support of EPA's Final Rule."
Environmental Petitioners challenged the legitimacy of the
following aspects of EPA's Final Rule: 1) that EPA exceeded its authority
under the CWA when it issued its Final Rule excluding pesticides; 2) that
6 See discussion infra Part III.B., para. 1.
7 See Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483 (Nov. 27, 2006).
8 Nat'1 Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 940.
Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71
Fed. Reg. at 68,483.
10 Nat'1 Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 932. These petitions were filed in the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, but were
consolidated in the Sixth Circuit by order of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407 and 2112(a)(3) (2006). Id.
" Id.
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EPA exceeded its authority by characterizing excess pesticide and
pesticide residue as a "nonpoint source pollutant"; and 3) that EPA may
not exempt applications of pesticides that are compliant with FIFRA from
the permitting requirements of the CWA.12 Industry Petitioners, on the
other hand, claimed that the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious because
it treats FIFRA-compliant applications of pesticides as non-pollutants, but
treats the very same pesticides as pollutants if applied in violation of
FIFRA.'" Upon review, the Sixth Circuit held 1) that the Final Rule
properly characterizes excess chemical pesticide and chemical pesticide
residue, rather than all chemical pesticides, as "pollutants" under the
CWA; 2) that the Final Rule improperly excludes biological pesticides
from coverage as "pollutants" under the CWA; and 3) that the Final Rule's
mandate that excess pesticide and pesticide residue are "nonpoint source
pollutants" and, therefore, exempt from NPDES permitting requirements,
is improper.14 Since the court found that the CWA foreclosed the Final
Rule, the court declined to address the Industry Petitioner's petitions; and
for the foregoing reasons, the court vacated the Final Rule.' 5
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework: The Clean Water Act and
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
When Congress enacted the CWA, it outlined an initiative to
restore and preserve the chemical, physical, and biological composition of
the Nation's waterways.16 To achieve this end, the CWA employs a
blanket prohibition against the "discharge of any pollutant." 7 The Act
defines "discharge of any pollutant" as 1) the addition of any pollutant 8
12 Id. at 934.
1 id.
14 Id. at 940.
1 id
16 33 U.S.C § 125 1(a) (2006).
" See id. § 1311(a).
18 The CWA defines "pollutant" as including, but most relevant here, "chemical wastes,"
and "biological materials." Id. § 1362(6).
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19 20by a point source to navigable waters, or 2) "any addition of any
pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point
source other than a vessel or other floating craft., 21 However, if an entity
wishes to discharge a pollutant in a manner that would bring the discharge
within the purview of the CWA, EPA, or a state agency that has received
EPA authorization, it may be able to do so through the issuance of a
22NPDES permit. Such a permit may be granted if EPA determines that
the discharge of the pollutant in question is conducted in a manner
consistent with the provisions of the CWA.23
Under EPA's regulatory framework, the NPDES permitting
process may be conducted on an individual, case-by-case basis.24
Initially, if EPA tentatively decides to accept a permit application, it will
issue a draft permit.25 The permitting process is then subject to a thirty-
day period for public comment, as well as a potential public hearing in the
event that there is a "significant degree of public interest" in the draft
permit at issue.26 When EPA reaches a decision, that decision becomes
effective after 30 days unless review is requested.27 If a review is
requested, the effect of a contested permit is stayed pending EPA action
on the appeal.28
19 The CWA defines "point source" as "any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance.. . ." Id. § 1362(14).
20 The CWA defines "navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." Id. § 1362(7). EPA provides a definitional list of seven categories of
"waters of the United States." See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2008). Yet, while Congress
intended the term "navigable water" to be given "the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations," S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144
(1972) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3776, 3822, discharges of pollution
into groundwater do not fall within the purview of the CWA, Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554
F.2d 1310, 1329 (5th Cir. 1977).
21 33 U.S.C § 1362(12).
22 Id. § 1342(a).
23 id.
24 40 C.F.R. § 124.1(f).2 5Id. § 124.6(c).
26 1d. §§ 124.10(b), 124.12(a)(1).
271d. § 124.15(b).281Id. §§ 124.16, 124.19.
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NPDES permits may be granted on a general basis as well.
General permits are designed to cover one or more categories or
subcategories of discharges produced by covered sources within a
specified area.29 In general, the same rules governing the issuance,
modification, revocation, and termination of NPDES individual permits
also apply to general permits. 30
FIFRA, the second statute that is relevant for the purposes of this
note, is the authority under which EPA regulates the sale, distribution, and
use of pesticides. 3 1 For a pesticide to be registered under FIFRA, EPA
must consider the potential effects of the pesticide, specifically, whether it
achieves its function through conventional usage without an unreasonable
adverse effect on the environment. 32 For pesticides that are registered,
FIFRA employs a uniform pesticide labeling system that indicates the
specified uses of a particular pesticide that has received government
approval.33 Furthermore, under FIFRA, even once a pesticide has been
registered, a registrant has a duty to report any adverse effects of a
pesticide that come to the registrant's attention. 34
B. The Regulation at Issue: EPA's Final Rule Regarding the
Application ofPesticides to Waters of the United States in
Compliance with FIFRA
According to EPA in its Final Rule, the confluence of the CWA
and FIFRA regulatory schemes has led to confusion among the regulated
community regarding permit requirements for pesticides applied to United
States' waterways. 3  This confusion is underscored by the holdings of a
handful of Ninth Circuit cases. On one hand, the court in Headwaters,
Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District36 and League of Wilderness Defenders v.
29 Id. § 122.28(a)(1)-(a)(2).
'o See id. § 122.28(b)(1).
" See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (2006).
32 Id. § 136a(c)(5).
" Id. § 136a(c)(9), (d).
3 4 Id. § 136d(a)(2).
3 Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71
Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,485 (Nov. 27, 2006).
36 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Forsgren37 held that NPDES permits are required for the application of
herbicides and pesticides to control gypsy moths, respectively.38  These
rulings prompted some Ninth Circuit states, such as California, Nevada,
Oregon, and Washington, to issue general NPDES permits, while others
have continued the established practice of not issuing such permits to
those who apply pesticides in compliance with FIFRA. 39  Further
ambiguity arose when the court held in Fairhurst v. Hagener40 that
pesticides meant to eliminate non-native fish from a lake, and applied in a
manner not resulting in residue or unintended effects, are not pollutants
under the CWA.4 1
In an effort to dispel such ambiguity, EPA issued an Interim
Statement that outlined the agency's position that pesticides applied to
waters of the United States in accordance with FIFRA are not pollutants
under the CWA.42 This guidance was followed by EPA's Final Rule that
revised 40 C.F.R. § 122.343 to exclude applications of pesticides, which
are applied consistently with the requirements of FIFRA, from NPDES
permitting requirements.44 To reach this conclusion, EPA opined that
pesticides can neither be defined as "chemical waste" nor as "biological
materials" for the purposes of the CWA.45 However, the Final Rule did
3 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
38 Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71
Fed. Reg. at 68,485.
39 Id. For example, four months after the Headwaters decision, the state of California
granted General Permit No. CAG990003 to authorize the application of aquatic pesticides
for pest management, which, according to the California State Water Resources Control
Board, was issued on an emergency basis "[b]ecause of the serious public health, safety
and economic implications of delay . . . ." Statewide General National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit for Discharges of Aquatic Pesticides to
Surface Waters of the United States (General Permit), Order No. 2001-12-DWQ, 2001
Cal. ENV LEXIS 12, at * 1 (Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd. July 19, 2001).
4 422 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2005).
41 Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71
Fed. Reg. at 68,485.
42 Id.
43 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(h) (2008).
"Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71
Fed. Reg. at 68,485.
45 Id. at 68,486-87.
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not make such an exception for pesticide residuals, which, EPA conceded,
comprise wastes of the pesticide application process.46 Nonetheless, EPA
contends that pesticide residue is a "nonpoint source pollutant" and is,
therefore, like pesticides generally, not subject to NPDES permitting
requirements under the CWA.47
C. Procedural Framework: The Chevron Doctrine and the
Administrative Procedure Act
In the instant case, the court is required to review EPA's Final
Rule under the doctrine promulgated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC.48
Under this doctrine, a reviewing court must first determine whether
Congress has directly addressed the particular question under review.4 9 if
the intent of Congress is clear, then the reviewing court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the will of Congress. 50 However, if Congress
has promulgated an ambiguous statute, an express delegation of authority
to the agency results, unless under the second step of the Chevron doctrine
the court determines that the agency's interpretation constitutes an
impermissible construction of the statute in question.5 1
To determine whether an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous
statute is permissible, the court must look to the standards provided in the
Administrative Procedure Act. 52 The Administrative Procedure Act
requires courts to invalidate agency actions, findings, and conclusions that
are ruled to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
46 Id. at 68,487.
47 id
48 Nat'l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 467
U.S. 837 (1984)).
49 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
50 Id. at 842-43. To determine the intent of Congress, a reviewing court should not
consider a particular statutory provision in isolation, but should elicit meaning by
reviewing the provision in context. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 666 (2007).
si Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
52 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006).
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not in accordance with law." 53 The Supreme Court has interpreted agency
decisions as "arbitrary and capricious" when:
[T]he agency has relied on factors that Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency experience. 54
Ultimately, an agency must show that it has examined relevant data in its
interpretation and presented a satisfactory explanation for its decision that
includes a rational link between the facts and the choice made.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Pesticides Qualify as "Pollutants" Within the Meaning of the CWA
In response to Environmental Petitioners' first argument that EPA
exceeded its authority under the CWA by promulgating a rule excluding
pesticides from the "pollutant" definition under the Act, EPA contended
that the CWA's definitional scheme is ambiguous as to pesticides. 5 6
However, of the sixteen items characterized as pollutants within the CWA,
EPA conceded that "chemical wastes" and "biological materials" are the
only likely candidates that could encompass pesticides.5 7  Therefore,
under Chevron, the court attempted to analyze the plain meaning of these
listings in an effort to determine whether Congress's intent was clear in
58regards to pesticides.
" Id. § 706(2)(A).
54 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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1. Chemical-Based Pesticides as "Chemical Waste"
In its attempt to define "chemical waste," the court first turned to
several dictionary definitions 59 of "waste," which included source material
from The New Oxford American Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary, and
The American Heritage Dictionary.60 From these definitions, the court
concluded that "chemical waste" includes "discarded" chemicals,
"superfluous" chemicals, or "refuse or excess" chemicals for the purposes
of the CWA.6 1 Therefore, if a chemical pesticide is intentionally applied
to water in order to perform a useful purpose and does not leave any
excess upon completion of its purpose, then it is not "chemical waste" and
does not require an NPDES permit. 62
As for situations where excess pesticide and/or pesticide residue
persist after a given pesticide has run its intended course, EPA conceded
that such pesticide remnants meet the definition of "waste" and that EPA's
Final Rule reflects this interpretation. 63 Under this standard, the court
noted that chemical pesticides may qualify as pollutants under the CWA in
the following two situations: 1) when pesticide is applied in a non-aquatic
setting, but finds its way into the navigable waters of the United States;
and 2) when pesticide is applied directly and purposefully to navigable
waters to serve a beneficial purpose and pesticide residue remains in the
water after the completion of the pesticide's purpose.64 According to the
59 Citing cannons of construction, the court noted that a word in a statute should be given
its "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning, absent an indication Congress intended
[it] to bear some different import." Id. at 936 (citing Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa &
Chippewa Indians v. Office of U.S. Attorney, 369 F.3d 960, 967 (6th Cir. 2004)).
6 Id. The court noted that "waste" has been defined as "eliminated or discarded as no
longer useful or required after the completion of a process," id. (quoting THE NEW
OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1621 (2001)); "[r]efuse or superfluous material, esp.
that after a manufacturing or chemical process," id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1621 (8th ed. 2004)); and "any useless or worthless byproduct of a process or the like;
refuse or excess material," id. ((quoting N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration &
Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1447 (1979))).
61 Id.
62 Id. (citing Fairhurst v. Hagener, 422 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005)).
63 Id.
6 Id. at 936-37.
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court, the second situation presents a regulatory quandary where both non-
waste aqueous pesticides, which are not subject to CWA limitations, and
pesticide residue, which meet the CWA's "pollutant" definition, are
applied to water at the same moment. 65 However, according to the court,
this kind of situation does not pose much of a practical problem because
EPA and industry experience with chemical pesticides is sufficient to
devise a regulatory scheme for pesticides that result in chemical residue.66
2. Biological-Based Pesticides as "Biological Materials"
As with "chemical waste," the court continued it analysis by
determining whether the plain meaning of "biological materials" as listed
within the CWA encompassed biological pesticides. 67  Again, citing
dictionary references,6 8 the court concluded that the text of the statute is
unambiguous.69 However, EPA disagreed with the court's conclusion,
citing precedent that the term "biological material" had been found
ambiguous and that some biological material, specifically, mussel shells
and mussel byproducts, had been judged as not constituting pollution
under the CWA.70 In response, the court noted that the precedent cited by
EPA, while distinguishable, applies to a definitional analysis of the
"outermost bounds" of "biological materials" rather than to the more
651d. at 937.66 Id. For example, the chemical antimycin leaves no residue after completing its
intended function and, therefore, does not need to be regulated under the CWA. See
Fairhurst v. Hagener, 222 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005).6 7 Nat'l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 937-38.
68The court refers to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1392 (1993), which defines "material" as "of,
relating to, or consisting of matter" and "the basic matter from which the whole or the
great part of something is made"; and the Oxford English Dictionary Online - material,
adj., n. and adv. (Draft Revision June, 2009), http://dictionary.oed.com (search for
"material"), which defines "material" as "that which constitutes the substance of a thing
hysical or nonphysical); a physical substance; a material thing." Id. at 937.
Id.
70 Id.; see Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld & Totten Inlets v. Taylor, 299 F.3d 1007,
1016 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the CWA is "ambiguous on whether 'biological
materials' means all biological matter regardless of quantum and nature").
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limited analysis of its ordinary meaning.7 1  According to the court,
interpreting the ordinary meaning of "biological material" to exclude
biological pesticides would be contrary to the intent of Congress, which
purposefully drafted the CWA to include "material" following
"biological" as opposed to a more limited term such as "waste" as is used
to signify pollution of a chemical nature. 72
Furthermore, to bolster its interpretation, the court cited precedent
of its own that, while not addressing issues regarding biological pesticides,
supported the court's contention that biological pesticides constitute
"biological material."73 Ultimately, the court reasoned that like the
material at issue in these prior cases, biological pesticides, in addition to
meeting the definition for "biological material," result in effects consistent
with the following general definition for "pollutant" found within the
CWA: "the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical,
physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water."74  The court
concluded that, consistent with this definition, biological pesticides
undeniably alter the biological integrity of water.75 Therefore, biological
pesticides constitute a type of aqueous pollution; specifically, "biological
materials," under the CWA.76
7n Nat'l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d at 937-38.
72 Id. at 938.
7 Id; see National Wildlife Federation v. Consumer Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 583 (6th
Cir. 1988) ("Millions of pounds of live fish, dead fish and fish remains annually
discharged in Lake Michigan .. . are pollutants within the meaning of the [CWA], since
they are 'biological materials."'); United States Pub. Interest Research Group v. Atl.
Salmon of Me., 215 F. Supp. 2d 239, 247 (D. Me. 2002) (citing Higbee v. Starr, 598 F.
Supp. 323, 330-31 (D. Ark. 1984)) ("[S]almon feces and urine that exit the net pens and
enter the waters are pollutants as they constitute 'biological material' or 'agricultural
wastes."').
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B. Chemical Pesticide Residuals are Added to Waterways by "Point
Sources"
EPA's second argument in defense of its Final Rule that pesticides
should not be regulated under the CWA was that excess pesticide and
pesticide residue are not discharged from a "point source."" EPA
reasoned that excess and residual pesticide is not discharged from a "point
source" because upon discharge there is only pesticide.78 According to
EPA, since excess and residual pesticides do not exist until after
discharge, such pesticides should be treated as emanating from "nonpoint
sources." 79
The court disagreed, stating that the CWA does not include a
temporal requirement that a discharged chemical pesticide must
immediately cause harm to be characterized as coming from a "point
source."80  According to the court, EPA's interpretation ignored the
CWA's directive to protect water quality by omitting discharges from the
permitting program that are innocuous at the time of discharge, but are
extremely harmful at a subsequent point. 8 ' Rather, the court noted that all
that is required for a pollutant to be considered as emanating from a "point
source" is that the discharge comes from a "discernible, confined, and
discrete conveyance." 82
V. COMMENT
A. Biological Versus Chemical Pesticides: Is the Statutory Distinction
Nonsensical?
Given the broadness of the terms "biological material" and
"chemical waste" found within the CWA's definition for "pollutant," and
the Sixth Circuit's reliance on the dictionary definitions of the terms, it
"Id. at 938-39.78 d. at 938.
7 Id. at 938-39.
'
0 Id. at 939.
81 Id.
1Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006)).
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was likely difficult for the court to reach a conclusion other than that
pesticides fall within the mandates of the CWA. However, the court's
interpretation of the CWA peculiarly defines biological pesticides - in all
manifestations - as "pollutants," while chemical pesticides only meet the
definition if applied in an excess or residual manner. Did Congress
intend this distinction? Does it even make sense?
In its Final Rule, EPA cited this abnormality in defense of its
decision not to generally classify pesticides as pollutants.84 It is debatable
whether it was likely when the CWA was drafted in 1972 that Congress
considered biological pesticides in drafting its definition for "pollutant."8 5
Yet, whether intended or not, such a distinction in regulatory schemes that
burden the dischargers of biological pesticides more than those of
chemical pesticides "would not make sense" considering that biological
pesticides are widely considered to have fewer adverse environmental
consequences than chemical pesticides. 86  In addition, biological
pesticides do not enjoy the widespread use of chemical pesticides.1 With
these considerations in mind, the burdensome imposition of more stringent
83 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1-2.
8 Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71
Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,486-87 (Nov. 27, 2006).
85 Compare id. at 68,486 ("[A]t the time the [CWA] was adopted in 1972, chemical
pesticides were predominant. It is therefore not surprising that Congress failed to discuss
whether biological pesticides were to be covered by the Act.") with Final Opening Brief
of Environmental Petitioners at 14-15, Nat'l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d 927 (No. 06-
4630), 2007 WL 5117920 ("[T]he congressional purpose was to identify expansively and
anticipate all the physical 'stuff' that could end up in the wrong place to the detriment of
water quality." (quoting Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d
546, 565-66 (5th Cir. 1996))).
86 Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with FIFRA, 71
Fed. Reg. at 68,486. According to EPA, biological pesticides, which are derived from
natural materials including animals, plants, bacteria, and certain minerals, are less toxic,
better at affecting the target pest, and are more effective in avoiding pollution issues than
chemical pesticides. EPA.gov, What are Biopesticides?,
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/whatarebiopesticides.htm (last visited Sept.
3, 2009).
87 In 2004, it was estimated that twenty-six billion dollars is spent per year on chemical
pesticides while only 300 million is spent on biological pesticides. Daniela Muhawi, Safe
Pesticides?, ECOWORLD, June 25, 2004, http://ecoworld.com/features/2004/06/25/safe-
pesticides/.
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permitting requirements on users of biological pesticides would be
inconsistent with the goals of the CWA because it would encourage the
use of more environmentally deleterious chemical pesticides.8 8
In contrast, EPA's administration of FIFRA employs a logical
registration scheme that rewards biological pesticide use. According to
EPA, since biological pesticides pose fewer risks than chemical pesticides,
less technical data is needed for registration, which results in shorter
registration periods than for chemical pesticides.8 9  Furthermore, EPA
encourages the use of biological pesticides through the Pesticide
Environmental Stewardship Program, which provides assistance and
funding opportunities to pesticide users who reduce pesticide risk through
methods including, but not limited to, the use of biological pesticides. 90
In light of the benefits of biological pesticides, EPA's incentives
under FIFRA make sense. Not only does the CWA offer no such
incentives, but also it irrationally penalizes the use of biological pesticides
by providing no NPDES permit exception for use not resulting in excess.
Regardless of the plain language of the CWA, Congress could not possibly
have intended or envisioned the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of the
"pollutant" provision of the CWA and the Sixth Circuit should have taken
this into account in its statutory interpretation. ' If the court, realizing the
incongruous result of its interpretation, took extra-textual factors into
account, it may have instead found that the CWA is ambiguous as to
88 See Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. at 68,486-87.
89 What are Biopesticides?, supra note 86. Specifically, while it takes chemical
pesticides on average more than three years to obtain registration, biological pesticides
are often registered in less than a year. Id.
90 EPA.gov, About PESP, http://www.epa.gov/oppbppdl/pesp/about.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2009).
9 See, e.g., Final Brief of Respondent United States Environmental Protection Agency at
44, Nat'l Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (No. 06-4630), 2007 WL 5117921
(quoting 117 CONG. REc. 38,839 (1971)) ("'Senator Muskie, one of the primary sponsors
of the [CWA], when asked whether a particular discharge would be regulated under the
[CWA], stated: "we get back to what a 'pollutant' is under a particular set of
circumstances. I cannot interpret all of the circumstances. The Administrator can do
so.'").
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whether "pollutant" was meant to include pesticides. 92  This analysis
would, of course, lead the court to the second step of the Chevron
analysis. 93 EPA would likely have passed that step as it has shown that
the CWA would characterize biological and chemical pesticides
irrationally and that this observation is rationally related to the exclusion
of pesticides from CWA coverage in certain circumstances.
B. The Requirement ofNPDES Permits for Certain Pesticide
Applications: A Cumbersome and Potentially Dangerous
Regulatory Scheme
While the incongruity of the CWA and FIFRA's permitting
requirements should be addressed, the Sixth Circuit's opinion raised an
even more fundamental question concerning the regulation of pesticides.
From a policy standpoint, are two separate permitting schemes necessary,
or even advisable, for the management of pesticides affecting our Nation's
waters? Considering that pesticides are utilized to combat everything
from pests that have the potential to spread disease, such as West Nile
Virus, to pests that can decimate our food supply, the short answer is "no."
The concern over such detrimental environmental and human health
consequences was one of the primary reasons that EPA sought to clarify
the issue.94 Such apprehension centers on the consequences of a dual-
permitting scheme that could substantially limit the use of pesticides to
control disease-spreading insects, pests that infest forests and promote
92 See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,455 (1989) (quoting Boston
Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S., 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928)) ("Looking beyond the naked text for
guidance is perfectly proper when the result it apparently decrees is difficult to fathom or
where it seems inconsistent with Congress' intention, since the plain-meaning rule is
'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of
persuasive evidence if it exists."').
See discussion supra Part III.C., para. 2.
94 See Application of Pesticides to Waters of the United States in Compliance with
FIFRA, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,483, 68,485 (Nov. 27, 2006) (stating that the prospect of
pesticides requiring NPDES permits in addition to FIFRA permits elicited fear and
uncertainty among public health officials and natural resource managers concerning the
impact of such a requirement on their abilities to adequately protect human health and the
environment).
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forest fires, noxious weeds that disrupt irrigation, and potentially
devastating weed and insect infestations that threaten our food supply. 95
Given the administrative hurdles required to obtain an NPDES
permit, such trepidation appears justified. 96 Protracted regulatory
requirements will result in states or EPA taking up to several months to
issue an NPDES permit for a single pesticide application. 97 Furthermore,
as the permit review process presently stands, EPA and the states are not
equipped to handle the increase in permits that will result if or when
NPDES permits begin to be filed for the use of pesticides. 98 For the
foregoing reasons, individual NPDES permitting requirements, if imposed
upon pesticide users, would prove unviable under the current regulatory
framework.
An alternative espoused by Environmental Petitioners in their
opening brief is the ability of states and EPA to devise generalized
NPDES permitting schemes. 99 This suggestion is strengthened by the fact
that a handful of states have issued a few general permits for the use of
aquatic pesticides. 00 However, while this may be a viable option,
concern has been expressed that recent court decisions - including
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA1 ' and Environmental Defense Center,
Inc. v. EPA102 - have weakened the ability of general permits to be viable
mechanisms to ensure regulatory approval of pest control activities. 103 By
invalidating NPDES regulations for failure to require agency approval and
public participation, these cases threaten the ability of a permitting agency
9 Final Brief of Intervenor-Respondents at 53, Nat'l Cotton Council, 553 F.3d 927 (Nos.
06-4630, 07-3180-3187, 07-3191, 07-3236), 2007 WL 5117922.96 See discussion supra Part III.A., para. 2.
9 See Final Brief of Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 95, at 54.98 Id. To put this issue into perspective, as of 2005, EPA had an NPDES permit backlog
of 1,120 major permits and 9,386 minor permits. Id. (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. EPA, EVALUATION REPORT: EFFORTS TO MANAGE BACKLOG OF WATER DISCHARGE
PERMITS NEED TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY GREATER PROGRAM INTEGRATION, REPORT No.
2005-P-000 18, at 5 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/ reports/2005/20050613-
2005-P-00018.pdf).
99 Final Opening Brief of Environmental Petitioners, supra note 85.
' See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
0o 399 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2005).
102 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003).
103 Final Brief of Intervenor-Respondents, supra note 95, at 56-59.
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to establish broad operational requirements without time intensive agency
and public review, which will thereby threaten to postpone the ability of a
discharger to gain timely coverage.10 4 Furthermore, these cases may be
the opening act in a jurisprudential trend that could invalidate the essential
traits of NPDES general permitting that makes such permits an efficient
alternative to individual permits.05
C. The Hazards of Pesticides in Our Nation's Waters: Is FIFRA
Enough?
Opponents of an NPDES permitting requirement for pesticides not
only decry its potential adverse consequences for human health and the
environment, but also assert that FIFRA is sufficiently capable of
effective regulating pesticides that end up in the Nation's water
supply. 0  However, despite FIFRA registration requirements, why are
there dangerous levels of pesticides in our Nation's waters? According to
a survey conducted by EPA, the herbicide atrazine was the second most
frequently detected pesticide in drinking water wells and is often found in
concentrations above safe levels, as determined by EPA as three parts per
billion, in several states, including Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, and New York. 0 7
Recent studies have linked atrazine, among other herbicides and pesticides
found in water supplies, to various health and environmental problems. 0 8
'04Id. at 58.
105 See id. at 59.
106 See, e.g., Meghan Rhatigan, Legislation Overlap: Should the Clean Water Act or the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Prevail when Pesticides End Up in
U.S. Waters?, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2183, 2206-08 (2004).
107 Consumer Factsheet on: Atrazine,
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/pdfs/factsheets/soc/atrazine.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2009).
Approximately seventy-six million pounds of atrazine is discharged in the United States
per year. Edward Walsh, EPA Stops Short ofBanning Herbicide, WASH. PosT, Feb. 1,
2003, at A14.
108 For example, a recent study found a correlation between the poor semen qualities of
men residing in Boone County, Missouri (relative to men living in the urban centers of
New York, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis) and exposure to pesticides, including atrazine,
in local drinking water. Shanna H. Swan et al., Semen Quality in Relation to Bio-markers
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This data suggests that FIFRA registration does not adequately protect
against disruptive amounts of pesticide water contamination. In fact, some
commentators have suggested that FIFRA requires revision because of its
focus on economic efficiency as opposed to a focus on reducing
environmental and human risks.109
However, even though FIFRA may be deficient, the imposition of
NPDES permitting requirements on pesticide users will not necessarily
cure this problem. The unsettling reality is that the CWA does not cover
all types of water sources."10 Significantly, the CWA's "navigable water"
coverage does not include ground water, which is a common source of
pesticide contamination."' As a result, fifty percent of the Nation's
drinking water is not covered by the CWA.112 Of even greater
consequence, in the Nation's agricultural areas where pesticides are most
often used, as much as ninety-five percent of the population relies on
ground water.' 13 In light of these facts, NPDES permits are not the right
solution to the problem of the accumulation of deadly pesticides, like
atrazine, in the water supplies that humans use and enjoy on a daily
basis.' 14
ofPesticide Exposure, 111 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 1478, 1478 (2003), available
at http://www.ehponline.org/members/2003/6417/6417.html.
109 E.g., Mary J. Angelo, The Killing Fields: Reducing the Causalities in the Battle
Between US. Species Protection Law and U.S. Pesticide Law, 32 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV.
95, 138-39 (2008).
110 See supra note 20.
' See generally USGS.gov, Pesticides in Ground Water,
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/pesticidesgw.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2009) ("Pesticides
can reach water-bearing aquifers below ground from applications onto crop fields,
seepage of contaminated surface water, accidental spills and leaks, improper disposal,
and even through injection waste material into wells.").
112 id.
11 id.
114 This comment is not meant to suggest that pesticides do not find their way into bodies
of water that are covered by the CWA. On the contrary, such contamination is quite
common. For example, a 2002 assessment of the water quality of the Great Lakes found
that ninety-nine percent of the 50,866 square miles of Great Lakes open waters that were
surveyed are impaired as to one or more of their designated uses, such swimming,
fishing, et cetera. EPA, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO CONGRESS,
2002 REPORTING CYCLE 10 (2007), available at
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VI. CONCLUSION
At first blush, the National Cotton Council of America v. EPA
decision, issued at a time of transition to an arguably more
environmentally friendly Administration, stands as a repudiation of the
notoriously pro-industry stance of the Bush-era EPA. Yet, as noble as
protecting the sanctity of our Nation's waters may be, as the old clich6
goes, the road to hell is often paved with good intentions. Regardless of
the impetus behind EPA's Final Rule, it is clear that Congress did not
intend to impose NPDES permitting requirements on pesticide dischargers
and that, unfortunately, the costs of such an imposition outweigh any
possible benefits.
The classification of pesticides as "pollutants" under the CWA has
problems; specifically, biological pesticides always satisfy the definition,
while more environmentally destructive chemical pesticides only meet the
definition when applied in amounts sufficient to produce excess. In the
event that the National Cotton Council decision stands, the CWA should
be amended to correct this irregular outcome. Even in the event that the
disparity mentioned above is corrected in the CWA, the requirement of
subjecting pesticide dischargers to a potentially slow NPDES permitting
process may have unfortunate results when human health or the
environment is at stake. Furthermore, the CWA does not cover
groundwater - a major source of pesticide contamination. If the problems
involving pesticides are to be addressed, let it be achieved through FIFRA,
which applies to all pesticides regardless of the context of application.
While FIFRA may be amended to make it more effective with regards to
pesticides in the Nation's waterways, NPDES permits will only serve to
increase the administrative burden while accomplishing very little.
MICHAEL C. RISBERG
729
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of the top three causes of such impairment. Id. at 19.
